ISCAP-M will very likely pursue violent escalation over the next three months, likely continuing the expansion towards the southern districts of Capo Delgado (Chiure, Mecufi) and threatening the northern districts of Nmapula province. Quirimbas National Park and the surrounding areas (e.g. Pemba Bay) will likely represent a central hotspot for ISCAP-M economic and violent activities in the coming months, given its central position in Capo Delgado and relevance for the illicit trade of Rubies, Heroin, cocaine and methamphetamines. 

The group will very likely continue to exploit ethnic tensions, religious differences, and socio-economic grievances to foster local recruitment. ISCAP-M will likely seek to capitalize on SAMIM’s progressive withdrawal and FADM’s deficiencies by incrementally adopting looting and property destruction techniques to resupply goods and weapons and implementing its integralist moral agenda. The group will likely avoid large-scale symbolic actions against multinational corporations due to its limited firepower and the high-security levels around extractive infrastructures, likely preferring to engage in rural areas and small-scale public destruction of “impure goods” (e.g. cigarettes, alcohol) in the upcoming three months. ISCAP-M will very likely increasingly employ civilian targeting and abductions to eliminate or displace hostile communities and increase its demographic base. The group will very likely preferentially target Christian communities in Capo Delgado, driven by ISCAP-M’s salafi-jihadist ideology and the desire to expand its controlled territory.  

The online propaganda campaign will likely intensify over the next three months amid national and international actors' likely underestimation of the jihadist crisis, as indicated by SAMIM’s imminent retreat. The campaign will likely target regional and international radicalised audiences to foster recruitment and enhance ISCAP-M’s limited international outreach and ties. IS has very likely noticed the decreasing attention paid to Capo Delgado’s insurgency, following the low levels of violence registered during the majority of 2023 and resumption of principle extractive projects, and likely wants to exploit this conducive situation to revive violence, foster hijra, and gain territory. Even if the hijra is unlikely to reach the same international levels experienced in Syria and Iraq, ISCAP-M will likely attract radicalised individuals from southeastern Africa. Most foreign fighters will possibly come from Swahili-speaking countries (e.g. Tanzania) because of their geographical proximity, language compatibility, and absence of other jihadist insurgencies in the area. 

Niassa Special Reserve will possibly constitute the gateway for ISCAP-M activities towards Niassa province if the insurgency gains enough momentum. The reserve’s centrality for illicit routes and poaching, combined with its strategic position at the border with Tanzania, very likely renders it an appealing long-term objective for the group. Considering that the group never managed to expand to Niassa province during its maximum expansion between 2020-2021, ISCAP-M will likely primarily focus on the coastal areas, attempting to gain control of the profitable illicit routes (such as Drugs, Rubies, Wildlife) that the pass through the main ports (such as Palma, Mocimboa da Praia and  Pemba).