Extremism in the Sahel – Focus on ISSP
March 10, 2024
Sinking Signals: West Africa’s Data Blackout
March 15, 2024EXTREMISM IN THE SAHEL – JAMA'AT NASR AL-ISLAM WAL MUSLIMIN (JNIM)
Analysts: Samuele Minelli Zuffa & Moreblessing Takura Madzikatire
Senior Editor: Magdalena Breyer
What You Should Know
- Operational Region: JNIM initially began its operations in central and northern Mali (ML). The coalition’s activities expanded towards eastern Niger and northern, south-western, and eastern Burkina Faso (BF) in early 2018. The group has since expanded southward, increasingly affecting the northern regions of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin.
- Shifting Tactics: JNIM increased its attacks by 40% and armed clashes by 20% in 2023, very likely indicating a shift toward confrontational tactics. Remote explosives and kidnappings remained key strategies, respectively accounting for 10% and 8% of the incidents involving JNIM. Looting and property destruction made up 12% of the total incidents, despite their frequency halving in absolute terms compared to 2022.
- Geographical Expansion: JNIM pursued its expansion southward after consolidating its positions in the Gao (ML) and Sahel (BF) regions (see Fig 1). The coalition's violent activities in Burkina Faso doubled in 2023, with the country experiencing 73% of JNIM-related fatalities. This marks a notable shift from the previous year when more than 30% of such fatalities were in Mali's Mopti and Gao regions. JNIM operated in Mauritania, Guinea, and the northern regions of Ghana, Benin, and Togo, with no activity recorded in Côte d’Ivoire in 2023.
- 2024 Regional Forecast: Based on current trends, JNIM’s operations will likely continue to cause instability and violence in the Sahel region, including in the northern regions of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. The group's ability to expand geographically and increase the frequency of its attacks is likely to lead to further displacement of communities, disruption of local economies, and strain on regional security apparatuses.
Introduction
Despite only a marginal increase in fatalities compared to 2022, JNIM geographically expanded its activities southward in 2023. JNIM rendered Burkina Faso the epicentre of its violent activities, which the departure of the French military missions and the aggressive shift in Capt. Traoré’s counterinsurgency strategy likely boosted.
This assessment investigates JNIM’s evolutions during the last year, deepening its geographical areas of activity, tactics, and growing impact across the Central Sahel. Considering JNIM’s expansion towards the Gulf of Guinea, comprehending the dynamics that uphold this enlargement is vital for the peace and security of the Central Sahel and West Africa
Geographical Areas of Activity in 2023
JNIM operated across 8 countries in West Africa in 2023. JNIM-related fatalities in Mali and Burkina Faso combined constituted 95% of the total. JNIM-related fatalities nearly doubled in Burkina Faso and halved in Mali in 2023, a significant shift from the almost equal distribution of fatalities in 2022. This trend is very likely caused by the intensification of the counterinsurgency efforts by Burkina Faso’s junta combined with JNIM's ambitions to expand southward. Controlling the country very likely constitutes an essential step for JNIM's southward expansion, given that Burkina Faso borders 4 coastal states. The severe confrontations in Burkina Faso likely explain the plateau in JNIM activities across the coastal counties in 2023.
Timeline of Key Events
March 2017
al-Mourabitoune, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), Ansar Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) form Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (جماعة نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين; JNIM), a jihadist coalition affiliated to al-Qaeda and under the leadership of Iyag ag-Ghali, Ansar Dine’s leader.Early 2018
JNIM progressively expands its activities to northern Burkina Faso by exploiting the affinity between the FLM and Ansarul Islam, a Burkinabé jihadist group founded in 2016.Mid-2019
The end of the Sahelian exception. JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), now Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), started fighting each other after four years of peaceful coexistence. The Liptako-Gourma region, which is the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is the epicentre of this violent territorial competition.June 2020
JNIM expands its violent activities in northern Côte d’Ivoire. The coalition attacks the Kafolo border post, very likely using the Comoé National Park as a safe haven.Late 2021
JNIM performs the first assaults in northern Togo and northern Benin, likely exploiting Park W as a rear base.August 8, 2023
JNIM establishes a commercial blockade on the key city of Timbuktu (ML) likely due to its strategic position along crucial communication pathways and symbolic importance to West African Islam. The coalition very likely aims to obtain political concessions and foster civilian collaboration.August-September 2023
Local sources report the presence of JNIM militants near Bador (Upper East, Ghana) and Fatchu (Upper West, Ghana).November 24, 2023
JNIM assault the Malian Armed Forces’ (FAMa) base in Niafukne (Timbuktu, ML) by breaching the walls through a suicide car bomb. The attack kills 72 Malian soldiers and wounds 51 others. JNIM kidnaps 2 Malian soldiers, seizes 5 vehicles and a large amount of ammunition and weaponry.November 26, 2023
JNIM symmetrically attacks Djibo’s military base (Sahel region, Burkina Faso). The jihadists manage to penetrate the base and seize military equipment and vehicles despite Burkina Faso’s aerial response. The attack results in the killing of 22 soldiers, 50 terrorists, and 40 civilians.
Tactics & Techniques
JNIM employs various tactics strategically chosen based on the contextual challenges and opportunities it faces. Its capability to engage in both asymmetric and conventional confrontation, direct involvement in transnational organised crime, establishment of ad hoc institutions, and decentralised command chain make JNIM one of the most resilient and powerful security actors in the Central Sahel.
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), about 3,384 incidents involving JNIM caused more than 10,000 fatalities in 2023. The distribution of incident types are as follows:
Clashes & Attacks
Lootings
Explosives & IEDs
Abductions
Other
JNIM's Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP) and capabilities are characterized by:
Guerrilla Warfare and Conventional Tactics
The widespread use of motorcycles increases the mobility of operations, allowing JNIM to perform hit-and-run tactics while minimizing the damages caused by Air/Drone strikes. JNIM has simultaneously proven its capacity to increasingly perform conventional attacks through daytime assaults against military bases in Djibo (Sahel, BF) and Niafukne (Tombouctou, ML).
Kidnappings and Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)
JNIM facilitates and participates in illicit economies. Kidnapping for ransom, vehicle theft, cattle rustling, smuggling and trafficking, and regulating access to artisanal mines result in heightened political violence and constitute an essential revenue source for the coalition. Central Mali, the Liptako-Gourma area, the National Park of the Comoé are Park W are the epicentres of these illicit activities.
Blockades, Evictions and Looting
Apart from the systematic targeting and looting of non-collaborative civilian communities, the coalition implements sophisticated economic warfare tactics. JNIM established at least 40 blockades across Mali and Burkina Faso between March and July 2023, including the ongoing blockade in Timbuktu (ML), putting strain on the population to encourage its collaboration. JNIM has performed forced evictions and displacements, in cases of local community resistance, to clear the territory from recalcitrant actors.
Decentralised Structure and Resilience
JNIM has a capillary structure that fosters flexibility and resilience. JNIM organises itself in several battalions (Katibas) and operates in a decentralised manner despite having a central leadership and no clear distinction between its political and military wings. All battalions tend to have a rural rear base (Markaz) where the militants train and rest, a chief (Amirou) sided by a military commander, a consultative council (Choure), and religious judges (Qadis). Dormant cells are spread in the neighbouring urban areas, fostering recruitment, collecting goods and gathering intelligence. Women perform a central role in these cells.
Hybrid Governance
JNIM provides specific services in the territories where it is most present rather than seeking direct territorial control. The coalition operates as a security provider for its constituencies and has implemented a mobile justice system that functions as an alternative to the allegedly corrupted and slow secular justice. Militants escort the Qadis to the site of the dispute and resolve it through religious law (Sharia law). The group also plays a fundamental role in managing the access rights to artisanal gold mines and fertile grazing lands (bourgoutières).
JNIM's Impact in 2023
In 2023, JNIM experienced a 20.17% reduction in incidents, down to 3,384, but fatalities associated with these incidents rose by 4.61% to 10,640 from the previous year. The increased counterinsurgency efforts in Burkina Faso, coupled with JNIM's southward expansion strategy, significantly altered the regional conflict dynamics. Burkina Faso became JNIM's primary focus, with a marked shift in their activity - 1,841 incidents and 7,760 fatalities, compared to 2,480 incidents and 4,625 fatalities in the previous year. This change, characterized by fewer incidents but more fatalities, suggests a tactical shift in JNIM's approach, likely due to intensified military pressure. The group's use of more lethal methods, such as remote explosives and armed assaults, reflects an adaptation to the evolving conflict, particularly in Burkina Faso and the broader Sahel region. Conversely, JNIM's move into Benin showed an increase in incidents but a decrease in fatalities, indicating a strategy focused on territorial control rather than lethality.
This approach is evident in their activities in strategic locations like Monsey, W, and Pendjari National Parks, extending to Mandouri in Togo. Despite their inability to displace state forces in areas like Pendjari Park, JNIM resorts to coercive tactics like forced recruitment and threats to establish control. This tactic contrasts with their operations in Burkina Faso and illustrates a strategic shift in their expansion efforts. Additionally, JNIM's reliance on illicit activities, such as smuggling and taxing local populations, remains crucial for funding their operations. Despite a reduction in looting incidents in 2023, likely due to a shift towards armed clashes and the use of explosives, these economic strategies continue to be a cornerstone in sustaining and expanding their operations and influence in the regional jihadi network.
Opponents & Collaborators in 2023
Main Opponents
JNIM is engaged in a broad spectrum of military, political, and ideological battles against local, regional, and international forces. In the Sahel region, it faces a range of opposing actors including:
- Civilians in Burkina Faso - 24.32% of incidents
- Military Forces of Burkina Faso - 17.91% of incidents
- Civilians in Mali - 14.13% of incidents
- Military Forces of Mali - 9.66% of incidents
- Volunteer for Defense of Homeland (VDP) - 8.66% of incidents
JNIM's activities in Burkina Faso, particularly their frequent interactions with civilians and military forces, reflect the group's strategic focus on this region. The significant number of incidents involving civilians in both Burkina Faso and Mali underscores the extent to which civilian populations are impacted by JNIM's violence. The group often targets civilians to instill fear, control territories, and undermine state authority, exploiting their vulnerability and lesser protection compared to military targets. This strategy includes violent attacks, kidnappings, and coercion.
Facing stiff opposition in Burkina Faso and Mali, JNIM contends with non-state militias and pro-government forces. Key adversaries include the Dan Na Ambassagou and Dozo militias in central Mali's Mopti and Segou regions, formed to protect communities from jihadist attacks. In Burkina Faso, the VDP, especially under Ibrahim Traoré's leadership, has intensified offensives against JNIM, actively targeting jihadist strongholds. JNIM, in turn, attacks these militias and associated communities as part of its broader regional insurgency campaign. Internationally, JNIM encountered significant challenges from the French military's Operation Barkhane until its 2022 withdrawal and now faces formidable opposition from the Wagner Group and its Africa Corps in Mali. Additionally, JNIM's activities are hampered by the ISSP and are in a complex rivalry with the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) in the Sahel, marking a landscape of diverse and multifaceted opposition to JNIM's expansion efforts.
Main Collaborators
JNIM, serving as al-Qaeda's branch in the Sahel, represents a collaboration of multiple jihadist groups, including AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and Al-Mourabitoun. This strategic alliance among these factions aims to extend its operational influence across the region. The group further collaborates with local jihadist groups that share its objectives and ideologies, particularly in the focal area of Burkina Faso. Ansaroul Islam has become a key strategic ally in the northern regions of Burkina Faso, near the border with Mali, attacking security forces and civilian targets. Ansaroul Islam works closely with JNIM, sharing goals and collaborating within the region's Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist network, despite being a separate group with its own identity.
JNIM has garnered support from a wide array of ethnic groups across its operational territories, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, Songhai, and Bambara in Mali and Burkina Faso, reflecting the diverse social fabric of these areas. The coalition has also extended its reach to include the Dogon in Mali's Dogon Country and Seno-Gondo plain, the Minyanka in Mali's Sikasso region, as well as the Bissa, Djerma in Niger, Gourmantche, and Mossi in Burkina Faso. The dynamics between these groups and JNIM are complex and can vary significantly across different regions and among different communities within these ethnic groups. Some individuals or factions within these ethnic groups have formed temporary alliances with JNIM, often driven by local grievances, political, economic factors, or conflicts. Many members of these communities oppose violent extremism and have suffered from the actions of jihadist groups, including JNIM.
Forecast
JNIM is expected to adapt its operational tactics in response to increased military pressure and changing regional dynamics. This will likely include refining guerrilla warfare techniques, more frequent use of IEDs, and high-profile attacks on both military and civilian targets. As the Sahel region sees evolving counterinsurgency strategies, including collaborations with Russia and Africa Corps, JNIM might respond with more lethal tactics and seek regional partnerships, potentially leading to a rise in high-fatality incidents. The group is also likely to intensify its engagement in activities like smuggling, looting, and taxing local populations to fund its operations and withstand escalating pressures. Disrupting these revenue streams will be challenging due to the complex socio-economic terrain of the Sahel, yet crucial for regional counterinsurgency efforts.
The success of Burkina Faso's counterterrorism measures will depend on factors such as sustained aggressive military strategies, the ability to maintain and improve these efforts, and addressing the root causes of extremism. Political stability and ongoing international support will be key in combating JNIM’s growing capabilities. Coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea, including northern Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, face increasing risks from JNIM's expansion, driven by their strategic goals and exploitation of local grievances. JNIM's activities in these areas indicate an adaptation to regional dynamics and intentions to leverage socio-economic challenges and weaker counterterrorism infrastructures. Increased instability in these states could make them more vulnerable to radicalization and jihadist expansion, emphasizing the need for stronger security and socio-economic measures.
Moreover, intense competition between ISSP and JNIM in Burkina Faso, particularly in northern provinces and bordering regions with Mali and Niger, is likely to continue. These groups compete for control in overlapping operational areas, such as Menaka and Gao in Mali, fueled by various factors like external pressures, local alliances, and geopolitical changes in the Sahel. This rivalry, tied to their affiliations with global jihadist networks and the quest for regional dominance, is expected to further exacerbate violence and instability, impeding peace and development efforts in the region.
English
العربية
简体中文
Nederlands
Français
Deutsch
Italiano
Português
Русский
Español